I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing consensus, based on both historical analysis and econometric evidence, that monetary policy has strong effects on real output. There is not, however, any consensus about how to explain this fact. This paper explores the idea that the non-neutrality of policy arises from a failure of rational expectations. Specifically, we present evidence that agents systematically underestimate the effects of policy on aggregate demand.
Our central results concern the predictive power of policy shifts for real output and for expectations of output. We measure policy shifts with changes in the real federal funds rate; expectations are taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Like previous researchers, we find that increases in the funds rate reduce output at a horizon of roughly a year.
A higher funds rate also causes survey respondents to expect lower output, but the effect on expected output is substantially smaller than the effect on actual output. Thus increases in the funds rate lead systematically to negative errors in output expectations, a violation of rational expectations.
We also examine the predictive power of policy shifts for inflation and for expectations of inflation. Here, we cannot reject rationality. A rise in the real funds rate leads to a fall in inflation at a horizon of two years, and a roughly equal 2 fall in expected inflation. Thus policy shifts do not predict errors in inflation expectations.
Our results add new evidence to the general debate about the rationality of expectations. Most important, we find that rationality fails in a particular direction, one which helps explain the effects of monetary policy. To make this point, we analyze a simple macroeconomic model with sticky prices. In the model, policy is neutral under rational expectations. We show, however, that policy is non-neutral if agents systematically underestimate the effects of policy on aggregate demand.
Crucially, this assumption about expectations also produces results that match our empirical findings: policy shifts predict surprises in real output but not surprises in inflation. Thus our empirical results support our explanation for non-neutrality.
The remainder of this paper contains four sections. Section II describes our empirical methodology and Section III presents the results. Section IV interprets the results using our model, and Section V concludes.
II. METHODOLOGY
We explore the predictive power of shifts in monetary policy for three output variables: actual output, survey expectations of output, and the difference between the two. We perform a similar procedure for inflation. Here we describe the details of our approach.
1 Our choices of statistical models are based on previous work and our own diagnostic tests. Our choice of an inflation process is based on Barsky (1987) and Ball and Cecchetti (1990) . Our choice of an AR(1) process for output growth is based on Beveridge and Nelson (1981) and Campbell and Mankiw (1987) ; Perron (1989) proposes a shift in the mean in 1973:2. For both 3
A. The Basic Regressions
We measure output by real GNP (or GDP starting in 1992) , and inflation by the GNP deflator. For both variables, expectations are given by the mean forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). In an earlier version of this paper (Ball and Croushore, 1995) , we also examine expectations from the Livingston survey of business economists and the Michigan survey of consumers. One might expect the behavior of expectations to vary across the surveys, because of the different levels of sophistication of forecasters, general economists, and consumers.
It turns out, however, that our results are similar for all three surveys.
In studying both actual and expected variables, we examine deviations from the forecasts of univariate statistical models.
That is, we ask whether policy causes inflation and output to deviate from the paths that one would forecast based on their usual dynamics, and whether survey respondents expect these deviations. Our univariate model for quarterly output growth is an AR(1) process with a mean that shifts in 1973:2. Our model for inflation is an IMA(1,1) process. Given these models, we compute statistical forecasts using rolling regressions. 1 output and inflation, our ARIMA models are the smallest ones that pass tests for autocorrelation (the Durbin-Watson and Q tests) and the tests on forecast residuals suggested by Diebold and Lopez (1996) .
2 Expected output growth is calculated by comparing the mean forecast for the level of output four quarters ahead to the mean forecast for the current quarter. Similarly, expected inflation is constructed from forecasts of the GNP deflator four quarters ahead and in the current quarter. Actual output growth and inflation are calculated from the data available three months after the end of each quarter; this avoids problems arising from rebenchmarking of data and changing base years. For further details about the Survey of Professional Forecasters, see Croushore (1993 We measure policy shifts with changes in the real federal funds rate. This choice reflects the growing consensus among researchers that the real funds rate captures the stance of policy (e.g., Taylor, 1994) . For the results we report, the real funds rate is the nominal rate minus the mean of expected inflation from the SPF. We obtain similar results when we compute the real rate using other measures of expected inflation, such as lags of actual inflation.
3 The nominal federal funds rate is the quarterly average of the daily rate. Note that the data on current inflation expectations are published near the mid-point of each quarter. Therefore B e at t-1, and hence the real funds rate at t-1, are known when agents form expectations at t.
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B. Timing
Our data are quarterly. We examine overlapping observations of expected and actual variables over periods of one year. For an observation dated at quarter t, actual inflation is inflation from t to t+4. Our output variable is output growth from t to t+4. Expected inflation and growth from t to t+4 are reported by survey respondents during quarter t. Finally, our statistical forecasts of inflation and output growth are based on quarterly models estimated through t -1 (the last quarter for which data are available during quarter t).
We measure changes in the broad stance of policy with changes in the real federal funds rate over periods of a year.
For observation t, FF1 is the difference between the real funds rate in quarter t-1 (the last quarter completed before expectations are formed) and the rate four quarters earlier, during t-5. FF2 is the difference between the real funds rates at t-5 and at t-9, and FF3 is the difference between t-9 and t-13. These annual changes in the funds rate are the regressors in our equations for actual and expected inflation and output. rises in the real funds rate lead survey respondents to expect lower output. However, the effects on expected output are smaller than the effects on actual output: the sum of the coefficients on FF1 and FF2 is about -0.5. The effects of the FF 4 Note that, in Table 1 , each coefficient in the equation for y -y e is exactly the difference of the corresponding coefficients in the equations for y -y f and y e -y f . This fact follows algebraically from the properties of OLS.
III. RESULTS
A. Output
5 See Romer and Romer (1989, 1994) The significant effect of the FF variables on y -y e is a violation of rational expectations, because survey respondents observe these variables when they form expectations. Rationality 8 is rejected because respondents systematically underestimate the effects of policy shifts, both tightenings and easings. The SPF provides expectations of nominal income as well as output and inflation. When we regress errors in nominal-income expectations on the FF variables, the coefficients are negative; when FF1, FF2, and FF3 are included, the sum of coefficients is -0.48. The negative nominal-income surprise after a tightening is consistent with the negative surprise in real output and nearzero surprise in inflation. However, the standard errors in our nominal-income equations are large, and so the effects of the FF variables on nominal-income surprises are not statistically significant.
B. Inflation
9
there is little evidence against rationality of inflation expectations.
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IV. INTERPRETATION
A. Background
The behavior of expectations is crucial to the effects of monetary policy on real output. Recent research suggests that these effects are difficult to explain under the assumption of rational expectations, even using models with frictions in wageand price-setting. In particular, models of staggered price adjustment such as Taylor (1979) do not capture the inertia that makes it costly to reduce inflation. With rational expectations, tight monetary policy can reduce inflation in these models without any loss of output (Ball, 1991; Fuhrer and Moore, 1995) .
This result conflicts with the empirical evidence that disinflations almost always cause recessions (e.g., Ball, 1994) .
It is easier to explain the effects of monetary policy if expectations are less than fully rational (e.g., Roberts, 1997) .
Motivated by this idea, a large literature has tested the 7 Other recent studies using the SPF include Runkle (1990, 1995) , who do not reject rationality, and Bonham and Cohen (1995) , who do reject rationality. 
B. Assumptions
We consider an economy with an aggregate-demand curve--a negative relation between the price level and aggregate spending:
where y is real output, p is the price level, and x is a term capturing shifts in demand (all variables are in logs). The shift term x is determined by lagged monetary policy:
(2) x = q -1 , where q -1 measures the stance of monetary policy in the previous period. In comparing our empirical results to the model, we interpret a rise in the real federal funds rate as a fall in q.
For simplicity, we ignore non-monetary shocks that shift aggregate demand.
The supply side of the economy is given by a simple stickyprice model. A firm's desired nominal price, p*, is given by Most authors who study models such as ours assume rational expectations (see Romer, for example). We are interested, however, in the idea that agents underestimate the effects of policy shifts on aggregate demand. A simple version of this behavior is static expectations about the demand-shifter x: x e = x -1 . Under this assumption, price setters believe that demand is the same as in the previous period. Since x = q -1 , this is equivalent to believing that q -1 equals q -2 : price setters ignore the most recent shift in policy. Our assumption of static demand expectations is, of course, extreme; future work could consider cases in which expectations react partially to policy shifts.
Aside from ignoring the most recent policy shift, firms behave rationally. In particular, they form rational expectations of p and y conditional on their beliefs about x, and the knowledge that other firms have the same beliefs.
C. The Effects of Policy
We now examine the effects of policy in our model. We assume that the policy stance q shifts over time and derive the behavior of actual and expected inflation and output. The nature of the process driving q is not important for our purposes.
As a benchmark, we first consider the case in which expectations are fully rational. In our model, current variables are determined entirely by q -1 , which is known when prices are set. Thus rational expectations is equivalent to perfect 8 These derivations use our assumption that price setters form rational expectations conditional on their beliefs about demand. After setting x e = x -1 , we derive the behavior of y and p through standard rational-expectations arguments. We now assume static expectations about x: x e = x -1 . Taking expectations of equation (1) , and hence y e = 0. Combining these results and using (4) again yields p = p e = x -1 /s. Finally, substituting the solution for p into (1) yields y = x -x -1 = q -1 -q -2 . Combining these results, we obtain 8 (5) y -y e = x -x -1 = q -1 -q -2 ;
(6) p -p e = 0.
With static demand expectations, a shift in the policy stance affects actual output: y depends on q -1 -q -2 . In addition, equations (5) and (6) Why are expectations less than fully rational? One possibility is that agents form expectations using rules of thumb to reduce the costs of gathering and processing information (Ball, 1991; Roberts, 1997) . This may not, however, be a good explanation for the professional forecasters in the SPF, who have strong incentives to optimize fully. Lamont (1995) 
